How to Make Battleships Relavent Again

Battleship that emphasizes speed over armor or armament

A fast battleship was a battleship which emphasised speed without – in concept – undue compromise of either armor or ammunition. Well-nigh of the early World War I-era dreadnought battleships were typically built with low design speeds, so the term "fast battleship" is practical to a design which is considerably faster. The extra speed of a fast battleship was normally required to allow the vessel to conduct out boosted roles besides taking role in the line of battle, such equally escorting aircraft carriers.

A fast battleship was distinguished from a battlecruiser in that information technology would have been expected to be able to engage hostile battleships in sustained combat on at least equal terms. The requirement to deliver increased speed without compromising fighting ability or protection was the master challenge of fast battleship design. While increasing length-to-beam ratio was the virtually direct method of attaining a college speed, this meant a bigger ship that was considerably more costly and/or could exceed the naval treaty tonnage limits (where these practical – such as the Washington Naval Treaty shaping naval fleet composition after World War I). Technological advancements such as propulsion improvements and low-cal, high-strength armor plating were required in order to make fast battleships feasible.

Unlike battlecruiser, which became official Majestic Navy usage in 1911,^[i] the term fast battleship was substantially an breezy one. The warships of the Queen Elizabeth grade were collectively termed the Fast Division when operating with the Grand Armada. Otherwise, fast battleships were not distinguished from conventional battleships in official documentation; nor were they recognised as a distinctive category in contemporary ship lists or treaties. At that place is no divide code for fast battleships in the US Navy's hull classification system, all battleships, fast or slow, existence rated as "BB".

Origins [edit]

Between the origins of the armoured battleship with the French Gloire and the Purple Navy's Warrior at the start of the 1860s, and the genesis of the Majestic Navy'south Queen Elizabeth class in 1911, a number of battleship classes appeared which set up new standards of speed. Warrior herself, at over 14 knots (26 km/h) under steam, was the fastest warship of her day as well equally the nearly powerful. Due to the increasing weight of guns and armour, this speed was non exceeded until Monarch(1868) achieved 15 knots (28 km/h) under steam. The Italian Italia of 1880 was a radical pattern, with a speed of 18 knots (33 km/h), heavy guns and no belt armour; this speed was not matched until the 1890s, when higher speeds came to be associated with second-class designs such as the Renown of 1895 (18 knots) and the Swiftsure and Triumph of 1903 (xx knots). In these late pre-dreadnought designs, the high speed may take been intended to compensate for their lesser staying power, allowing them to evade a more powerful opponent when necessary.

From about 1900, interest in the possibility of a major increase in the speed of Purple Navy battleships was provoked by Sir John ("Jackie") Fisher, at that fourth dimension Commander-in-Master of the Mediterranean Fleet.^[ii] Possibly due to Fisher'south force per unit area, The Senior Officer's War Course of January 1902 was asked to investigate whether a ship with lighter armour and quick-firing medium guns (vi to ten in, 150 to 250 mm calibre), with a 4-knot (vii km/h) advantage in speed, would obtain any tactical advantage over a conventional battleship.^[3] It was concluded that "gun power was more of import than speed, provided both sides were determined to fight"; although the faster armada would exist able to choose the range at which it fought, it would exist outmatched at any range. It was argued that, provided that the fighting was at long range, an attempt past the faster armada to obtain a concentration of fire by "crossing the T" could exist frustrated by a turn-away, leading to the slower fleet "turning within the circle of the faster fleet at a radius proportional to the difference in speed"^[four] (Figure 1). State of war games conducted by the General Board of the US Navy in 1903 and 1904 came to very similar conclusions.^[five]

Fisher appears to accept been unimpressed by these demonstrations, and continued to press for radical increases in the speed of battleships. His ideas ultimately came to at to the lowest degree partial fruition in the Dreadnought of 1906; like Warrior before her, Dreadnought was the fastest likewise every bit the most powerful battleship in the world.

Early dreadnoughts [edit]

Dreadnought was the commencement major warship powered by turbines. She also included a number of other features indicating an increased emphasis on speed:

• An improved hull form was developed, with increased length-to-beam ratio.
• The thickness of the principal belt was reduced to 11 inches, compared to 12 inches for preceding classes.
• The belt terminated at the upper deck, the usual "upper belt" being deleted
• The forecastle was raised, assuasive higher sustained speed in heavy seas.

In the decade post-obit the construction of Dreadnought, the Purple Navy'due south atomic number 82 in capital ship speed was eroded, as rival navies responded with their own turbine-powered "dreadnoughts". Meanwhile, in the Britain, Fisher connected to press for yet college speeds, but the alarming cost of the new battleships and battlecruisers provoked increasing resistance, both within the Admiralty and from the new Liberal Government that took part in 1906. As a issue, a number of potentially significant fast battleship designs failed to achieve fruition.

A notable abortive blueprint was the 22,500-ton "X4" pattern of December 1905. This would have been a true fast battleship by the standards of the fourth dimension, conveying the aforementioned armament and protection equally Dreadnought at a speed of 25 knots (46 km/h). In the upshot, the British lead in dreadnought and battlecruiser construction was deemed to be so great that a further escalation in the size and cost of upper-case letter ships could not be justified. The X4 design is often described as a "fusion" of the Dreadnought concept with that of the battlecruiser, and it has been suggested that she "would have rendered the Invinciblesouthward obsolete".^[6]

Fisher was again rebuffed in 1909 over the first of the 13.five-in-gunned "super-dreadnoughts", the Orion class; of the two alternative designs considered, one of 21 knots (39 km/h) and the other of 23 knots (43 km/h), the Board of Admiralty selected the slower and cheaper design. Fisher had his dissent recorded in the board minutes, lament that "nosotros should non exist outclassed in any blazon of ship".^[7]

Queen Elizabeth class [edit]

In the event, Fisher'due south aspirations for faster battleships were not fulfilled until after his retirement in 1910. Following the success of the 13.v-inch (343 mm) gun, the Admiralty decided to develop a fifteen-inch (381 mm) gun to equip the battleships of 1912 construction programme. The initial intention was that the new battleships would take the same configuration as the preceding Iron Duke class, with five twin turrets and the so-standard speed of 21 knots (39 km/h; 24 mph). Notwithstanding, it was realised that, by dispensing with the amidships turret, it would exist possible to free up weight and volume for a much enlarged power found, and even so fire a heavier broadside than the Atomic number 26 Duke.

Although War College studies had earlier rejected the concept of a fast, light battlefleet (see "Origins" and Figure ane, above), they were now supportive of the concept of a Fast Division of 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph) or more than, operating in conjunction with a conventional heavy battleline, which could use its advantage in speed to envelop the head of the enemy line (Effigy 2). Compared to Fisher'due south idea of speeding up the entire battlefleet, the advantages of this concept were that there would be no need to compromise the fighting power of the chief fleet, and that it would exist possible to retain the use of the existing (and still brand-new) 21-knot ships. Up to this time, it had been assumed that the role of a Fast Sectionalization could be fulfilled by the battlecruisers, of which at that place were at that time ten completed or on guild.^[viii] However, information technology was realised that there were now two problems with this supposition. The first was the likelihood that the battlecruisers would be fully committed in countering the growing and very capable German battlecruiser force. The second was that, as the and so Beginning Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, put it, our beautiful "Cats" had thin skins compared to the enemy'due south strongest battleships. It is a rough game to pit ... seven or nine inches of armour against twelve or xiii".^[9]

The new battleships would, in fact, be the most heavily armoured dreadnoughts in the fleet. The original 1912 programme envisaged 3 battleships and a battlecruiser. Still, given the speed of the new ships, it was decided that a new battlecruiser would not be needed. The battleship design for the following year'due south programme, which became the Revenge form, also had fifteen-inch guns, merely reverted to the 21-knot speed of the chief battlefleet. Again, no battlecruiser was included, a determination which suggests that the fast battleships were perceived at that time as superseding the battlecruiser concept.

Battle of Jutland [edit]

When the fast battleship concept was put to the test at the Battle of Jutland, the Queen Elizabeths had been temporarily attached to Vice-Admiral Beatty'south Battlecruiser Armada at Rosyth (this was to release the Invincible-course battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron for gunnery exercise at Scapa Flow). The Queen Elizabeths proved an outstanding success, firing with bang-up rapidity, accuracy and effect, while surviving big numbers of hits from German 28.three-centimetre (11 in) and thirty.5-centimetre (12 in) shells, and successfully evading the main German battlefleet during the and so-called "run to the North". In the fighting, Warspite was severely damaged, suffered a steering failure and was obliged to withdraw, while Malaya suffered a serious cordite fire which nigh caused her loss.^[ten] However, both ships returned safely to port. This was in notable dissimilarity to the performance of the battlecruisers, of which three (out of 9 present) were destroyed by magazine explosions after a relatively small number of hits.

When the main body of the Thou Fleet came into activeness, the Queen Elizabeths were unable to reach their intended station ahead of the battleline, and instead joined the rear of the line, seeing little farther action. Meanwhile, the 6 surviving battlecruisers assumed the "Fast Division" role, operating ahead of the battleline with some success, exploiting their reward of speed to harm the head of the German line with virtual impunity.

Jutland was a crippling accident to the reputation of the existing battlecruisers. Nevertheless, it too reinforced the views of the commander-in-master, Sir John Jellicoe, that the Queen Elizabeths were also slow to operate with the Battlecruiser Fleet on a permanent basis. Based on gainsay reports, Jellicoe erroneously credited the German König-course battleships with 23 knots (43 km/h; 26 mph), which would hateful that Queen Elizabeths, which were proficient for but 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph), would exist in serious danger if they were surprised past a battlefleet headed past these ships.^[11]

The Admiral class [edit]

Even before Jutland, Jellicoe had expressed business concern at the lack of new construction for the Battlecruiser Fleet, and the inadequacy of the ships already provided. Early in 1916, he had rejected proposals for a new fast battleship pattern, similar to the Queen Elizabeth but with reduced draught, pointing out that, with the v new Revenge-class nearing completion, the armada already had a sufficient margin of superiority in battleships, whereas the absence of battlecruisers from the 1912 and 1913 programmes had left Beatty's force with no reply to the new 12-inch-gunned German battlecruisers. Jellicoe believed that the Germans intended to build still more than powerful ships, with speeds of up to 29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph), and hence chosen for thirty-knot (56 km/h; 35 mph) ships to fight them. Although two new battlecruisers (Renown and Repulse) had been ordered in 1914, and were beingness constructed remarkably quickly, Jellicoe argued that, although their speed was adequate, their armour protection was insufficient.^[12] The 1915 design was therefore recast as a 36,000-long-ton (37,000 t) battlecruiser with eight 15-inch (381 mm) guns, an eight-inch belt, and a speed of 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph).^[13] A class of four ships was ordered in mid-1916.^[14]

The losses at Jutland led to a reappraisal of the design. As noted above, the British were now convinced that their fast battleships were battleworthy but also slow, and their battlecruisers – fifty-fifty the largest – unfit for sustained battle. As a outcome, the new ships were radically redesigned in social club to achieve the survivability of the Queen Elizabethsouth while still meeting the requirement for 32-knot (59 km/h; 37 mph) battlecruisers, although this reworking was flawed. The resulting ships would be the Admiral-class battlecruisers; at 42,000 long tons (43,000 t) tons by far the largest warships in the earth. In 1917 structure was slowed down, to release resources for the construction of anti-submarine vessels; when information technology became clear that the threatened new High german battlecruisers would not be completed, the last three were suspended and ultimately canceled, leaving only the lead ship, Hood, to be completed.^[15]

Although the Royal Navy always designated Hood as a battlecruiser, some naval historians such every bit Antony Preston have characterised her as a fast battleship, as she theoretically had the protection of the Queen Elizabethdue south while beingness significantly faster.^[sixteen] On the other hand, the British were well enlightened of the protection flaws remaining despite her revised blueprint, so she was intended for the duties of a battlecruiser and served in the battlecruiser squadrons throughout her career, other than a few months assigned to Strength H in 1940. Moreover, the scale of her protection, though adequate for the Jutland era, was at best marginal confronting the new generation of 16-inch (406 mm)-gunned upper-case letter ships that emerged soon after her completion in 1920, typified by the U.s. Colorado course and the Japanese Nagato class.^{[17] [18]}

Other designs, 1912–1923 [edit]

During the Start World War, the Regal Navy was unique in operating both a Fast Sectionalisation of purpose-built battleships and a carve up strength of battlecruisers. Yet, the 1912–1923 period saw a series of advances in marine applied science which would eventually lead to a dramatic increment in the speeds specified for new battleship designs, a process terminated only past the appearance of the Washington Naval Treaty. These advances included:^[19]

• small-scale-tube boilers, allowing more efficient transfer of heat from banality to propulsive steam;
• increases in steam pressure and temperature;
• reduction gearing, which allowed propellers to rotate at a slower, and more efficient, speed than the turbines that powered them;^[19]

Past the early 1920s, the wealth of the U.s.a. and the ambition of Nippon (the ii Keen Powers least ravaged by World War I) were forcing the pace of capital transport blueprint. The Nagato class set a new standard for fast battleships, with xvi-inch (406 mm) guns and a speed of 26.5 knots (49.1 km/h). The Japanese appear to have shared Fisher's aspiration for a progressive increase in the speed of the whole battlefleet, influenced partly by their success at outmanoeuvring the Russian armada at Tsushima, and partly by the need to retain the tactical initiative confronting potentially larger hostile fleets. The firsthand influence of the Nagatos was limited by the fact that the Japanese kept their actual speed a closely guarded secret, admitting to only 23 knots (43 km/h; 26 mph).^[20] As a result, the The states Navy, which had hitherto adhered steadily to a 21-knot (39 km/h) battlefleet, settled for a modest increment to the same speed in the bootless South Dakota form of 1920.

The Japanese planned to follow upwardly the Nagatos with the Kii form, (ten 16-inch (406 mm) guns, 29.75 knots, 39,900 tons) described as "fast capital ships" and, co-ordinate to Conway'south, representing a fusion of the battlecruiser and battleship types. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy, alarmed at the rapid erosion of its pre-eminence in capital ships, was developing even more radical designs; the 18-inch (457 mm) gunned N3 class and the 32-knot (59 km/h; 37 mph), 16-inch (406 mm) gunned G3 class both of some 48,000 tons. Officially described as battlecruisers, the G3s were far amend protected than whatever previous British uppercase transport, and take by and large been regarded, like the Kiis, equally true fast battleships.^[21] The G3s were given priority over the N3s, showing that they were considered fit for the line of battle, and orders were actually placed. Yet, both the British and the Japanese governments baulked at the monstrous cost of their corresponding programmes, and ultimately were forced to accede to Usa proposals for an arms limitation conference; this convened at Washington DC in 1921, and resulted in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. This treaty saw the demise of the giant fast battleship designs, although the British used a scaled-down version of the G3 blueprint to build ii new battleships permitted under the treaty; the resulting Nelson-course vessels were completed with the pocket-sized speed of 23 knots.

The Italian Francesco Caracciolo-form battleships were designed to be similar to the Queen Elizabeth class, with viii 15-inch guns and a top speed of 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph), and therefore can be considered fast battleships. Still, structure (begun in 1914–1915) was stopped by the war, and none was always completed.^[22]

Washington Treaty era [edit]

The signatories of the Washington Treaty were the Usa, UK, Nihon, France, and Italy; at that fourth dimension the just nations in the world with significant battlefleets. As a upshot, the terms of the Washington Treaty, and the subsequent treaties of London 1930 and London 1936 had a decisive effect on the hereafter of capital ship design.

The treaties extended the definition of capital ship to cover all warships exceeding ten,000 tons standard displacement or carrying guns exceeding 8-inch (203 mm) calibre; imposed limits on the full tonnage of majuscule ships immune to each signatory; and fixed an upper limit of 35,000 tons standard displacement for all future structure. These restrictions finer signaled the terminate of the battlecruiser every bit a distinct category of warship, since any future large-gun cruiser would count confronting the capital letter send tonnage allowance. It also greatly complicated the problem of fast battleship design, since the 35,000-ton limit closed off the most directly route to higher speed, equally the increasing length-to-axle ratio would have meant a bigger ship.

Bear witness of continued interest in loftier-speed capital ships is given by the fact that, although the signatories of the treaties were allowed to build 16-inch (406 mm) gunned ships every bit their existing tonnage became due for replacement, most of them passed upward the opportunity to practice so, preferring instead lighter-armed but faster ships. A British Admiralty paper of 1935 concludes that a balanced design with 30-knot (56 km/h; 35 mph) speed and 16-inch guns would not be possible within the 35,000 ton limit, since information technology would be either insufficiently armoured or too slow; information technology is articulate that by this engagement the 23-knot (43 km/h; 26 mph) speed of the Nelsons was considered insufficient. The recommended pattern (never built) was one with nine 15-inch (381 mm) guns and speed "not less than 29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph)".^[23]

The 15-inch-gunned Littorio and Richelieu classes, built in the 1930s by Italy and France respectively, reflect similar priorities to the British.

Four capital letter ships of the treaty era were built to displacements appreciably less than the 35,000-ton limit; the French Dunkerque and Strasbourg and the German Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The Dunkerque class was built in response to the German Panzerschiff (or "pocket battleship") Deutschland class. The Panzerschiffe were, in effect, a revival of the late 19th century concept of the commerce-raiding armoured cruiser; long-ranged, heavily armed, and fast enough to evade a conventional majuscule send. Likewise, the Dunkerque, can be regarded as a revival of the armoured cruiser'due south nemesis, the battlecruiser. With 29-knot speed and 330 mm (13 inch) guns, she could operate independently of the fleet, relying on her speed to avoid confrontation with a more than powerful adversary, and could easily overtake and overwhelm a Panzerschiff, just as Sturdee'south battlecruisers had done to von Spee's cruisers at the Falkland Islands in 1914. On the other hand, equally a member of the line of battle, alongside the elderly and slow dreadnoughts that made up the remainder of the French battlefleet, the design would brand no sense, since her speed would lose its value and neither her armament nor her protection would exist at all constructive against a modernistic 16-inch gunned battleship such as Nelson.

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were Germany'south response to the Dunkerques. They were an attempt to redress the inadequacies of the Panzerschiff design in speed, survivability and powerplant (the diesel engines of the Panzerschiffe were unreliable and produced astringent vibration at high speed), and used much cloth assembled for the Panzerschiffe programme (most significantly, the six triple 11-inch (279 mm) gun mountings originally intended for Panzerschiffe D to F).^[24] Although much larger than the Dunkerques, the Gneisenaus were also non intended for the line of battle; apart from their insufficient ammunition, set-piece battles against the vastly more numerous Allied battlefleets had no place in Germany'south strategic requirements. Instead, the two German ships relied throughout their career on their superlative speed (over 32 knots) to evade the attentions of Allied uppercase ships. On Gneisenau, the nine 28.3 cm SK C/34 guns in three triple turrets were supposed to exist replaced with half dozen 38.1 cm SK C/34 guns in twin turrets, which would have rectified her key weakness, but work was cancelled.

The treaties also allowed the reconstruction of surviving battleships from the First Earth War, including up to 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) boosted protection against torpedoes, high-distance bombing and long-range gunnery.^[25] In the late 1930s, the Italian and Japanese navies opted for extremely radical reconstructions: in add-on to replacing the powerplant in their existing ships, they lengthened the ships by calculation actress sections amidships or aft. This had a double benefit; the actress space allowed the size of the powerplant to be increased, while the extra length improved the speed/length ratio and and then reduced the resistance of the hull.^[26] As a upshot, both navies realised significant increases in speed; for case the Japanese Ise class was increased from 23 to 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph), and the Italian Conte di Cavour class from 21 to 27 knots (39 to 50 km/h; 24 to 31 mph).^[27] France, the Britain and the US took a less radical approach, rebuilding their ships within their original hulls; boilers were converted to oil-firing or replaced, as were the engines in some cases, just increases in the output of the powerplant were generally canceled out by increases in the weight of armour, anti-aircraft ammunition and other equipment.^[28]

The exception to the European battleship trend was Japan, which refused to sign the Second London Treaty. It rather uncharacteristically settled for a moderate speed of 27 knots, for the sake of high levels of protection and firepower in the 18.1-inch (460 mm)-gunned, 64,000-long-ton (65,000 t) displacement Yamato class.

Later on much argue, the Us settled on two 35,000 ton classes, also with a speed of 27 knots, in the North Carolina and Southward Dakota classes. Due to treaty restrictions, firepower and protection were emphasised first, although both did manage respectable speed increases compared to their World War I contemporaries to exist able to operate as carrier escorts. The Us signed the 2nd London Treaty just was quick to invoke an "escalator clause" to increase the master battleship caliber from 14 to xvi inches equally Italian republic and Japan refused to adopt information technology. This fabricated the N Carolinasouth somewhat unbalanced ships, being designed to resist shells from the fourteen-inch guns that it was originally intended to carry, only being up-gunned during construction. The South Dakotas rectified this with protection proof against xvi-inch guns. In order to counter the increase in armor weight and stay within tonnage limits, the South Dakota class had to become with a shorter hull to reduce the length of the required protected expanse, compensating by installing more powerful machinery than in the North Carolinas, and this made the ships somewhat cramped. The balanced 35,000-ton design was achieved by combining highly efficient lightweight double-reduction gear machinery, which reduced the length and book of the armored citadel, with a sloped internal armored chugalug, which increased protection without increasing overall armor thickness. The U.s.a. also used the treaty's "escalator clause" to guild the 45,000-long-ton (46,000 t), 33-knot (61 km/h; 38 mph) Iowa course later on Japan'south withdrawal from the treaty. Existence free of treaty limitations, the Iowa course had new 16-inch guns with a greater maximum range, and it had even more than powerful engines and a diffuse hull for a significantly faster speed over the Northward Carolinas and South Dakotas.

For half a century prior to laying [the Iowa class] down, the U.S. Navy had consistently advocated armor and firepower at the expense of speed. Even in adopting fast battleships of the North Carolina class, it had preferred the slower of two alternative designs. Great and expensive improvements in mechanism design had been used to minimise the increased ability on the designs rather than brand boggling powerful machinery (hence much higher speed) practical. However the 4 largest battleships the U.S. Navy produced were not much more 33-knot versions of the 27-knot, 35,000 tonners that had preceded them. The Iowas showed no advance at all in protection over the South Dakotas. The principal armament improvement was a more powerful xvi-inch gun, 5 calibers longer. X yard tons was a very great bargain to pay for 6 knots.^[29]

Norman Friedman

Earth State of war Ii designs [edit]

The British battleships Vanguard (left) and Howe (right) moored alongside each other - these were the concluding two battleships to be commissioned by the Royal Navy, and were among the final battleships to be completed

In 1938 the U.s.a., UK, and France agreed to invoke the escalator clause of the Second London Treaty, allowing them to build upward to 45,000 tons standard.^[thirty] Past this time, all three allied nations were already committed to new 35,000-ton designs: the US North Carolinas (2 ships) and South Dakotas (four), the British King George V form (five ships) and the French Richelieusouth (two completed out of four planned, the last of the class, Gascogne, to a greatly modified design).

The United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland and U.s. laid downward follow-on classes, designed to the new 45,000 ton standard, in 1939 and 1940 respectively. The United states of america succeeded in completing four of the intended six Iowa class, but the British Lion class were non built; two of the planned four units were laid downwardly in the summertime of 1939, but neither was completed due to express chapters to produce the turrets and guns. They would have embarked nine 16-inch (406 mm) guns and, at 29 to 30 knots (50 to sixty km/h), would have been slightly faster than the King George V grade. The Britain did complete one concluding battleship to an "emergency" design, the Vanguard, a modified Lion design that could employ the 15-inch (381 mm) gun mountings removed from the World War I "large light cruisers" Mettlesome and Glorious after their conversion to aircraft carriers. Her design revised during the state of war to adopt lessons from the loss of other ships, she was completed in 1946 and was similar in speed to the Lions.

The last US battleship design was the first since 1922 to be entirely free of treaty constraints. The huge Montana-grade battleships represent a render to "normal American practise" in battleship pattern,^[31] with massive protection, heavy firepower, and moderate speed (28 knots). At 60,500 tons standard, they approached the size of the Yamatos, which they resembled in concept. V of these ships were ordered, only they were ill-suited to the needs of fast carrier task forcefulness operations, and none were laid down.

Summary of "fast battleship" classes [edit]

The following classes of warship have been considered to be fast battleships, in accordance with the definition used in this commodity and/or with contemporary usage. The list includes all new structure of the 1930s and 1940s, forth with some reconstructions; this reflects the fact that, while not all of these ships were notably fast past gimmicky standards of new construction, they were all much faster than the considerable number of capital letter ships built in the pre-Treaty era and still in service at that time.^[32] All speeds are blueprint speeds, sourced from Conway'due south;^[33] these speeds were often exceeded on trial, though rarely in service.

Royal Navy [edit]

• Queen Elizabeth class (24 knots): the prototype fast battleship grade
• Hood (32 knots), the sole member of the Admiral class, was characterised by the Royal Navy equally a battlecruiser throughout her lifetime; nonetheless some modern authorities characterise her as a fast battleship, as she appeared on paper to exist an improvement over the Queen Elizabeth class.^{[34] [35]}
• Male monarch George V class (28 knots)
• Vanguard (30 knots)

United states of america Navy [edit]

• North Carolina class (28 knots)
• South Dakota grade (27.v knots)
• Iowa form (33 knots)

Imperial Japanese Navy [edit]

• Kongō class – as reconstructed (30.five knots). Originally classified as battlecruisers, these ships were reclassified as battleships after their first reconstruction in 1929–1931.^[36] Even later on a 2nd reconstruction in the belatedly 1930s, they remained relatively weak in armament and protection by Second World War standards.^[37]
• Nagato class – as completed (26.5 knots). Unusually for a Japanese design, the speed was reduced to 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph) when the class was reconstructed in 1934–1936.^[38]
• Yamato class (27 knots)

German Navy [edit]

• Scharnhorst class (too known as the Gneisenau grade) (31 knots). These ships were officially designated kleine Schlachtschiffe ("small battleships"). The contemporary Royal Navy termed them "battlecruisers", on the basis of their exceptionally high speed and weak ammunition.
• Bismarck grade (30.viii knots)^[39]

French Navy [edit]

• Dunkerque class (29.5 knots). Every bit with the Gneisenau class, the Royal Navy termed these ships "battlecruisers".
• Richelieu class (32 knots)

Royal Italian Navy [edit]

• Conte di Cavour class – as reconstructed, 1933–1937 (27 knots)
• Andrea Doria class – as reconstructed, 1937–1940 (26 knots)
• Littorio grade (30 knots).

References [edit]

1. ^ Admiralty Weekly Guild no. 351, 24 Nov 1911; quoted in Roberts (2003), p. 24
2. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 11
3. ^ Roberts (2003), p. xvi
4. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 17
5. ^ Dark-brown (2003a), p. 188
6. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 26
7. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 32
8. ^ 3 Invincible class, iii Indefatigable, 2 Lion course, HMSQueen Mary and Tiger
9. ^ Churchill (2005), Part 1, Chapter v
10. ^ Campbell (1986), p. 132
11. ^ Jellicoe (2006), Chapter thirteen harvp fault: no target: CITEREFJellicoe2006 (aid); the relevant passage is available on-line at the War Times Journal website
12. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 56
13. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 58
14. ^ Raven & Roberts (1976), p. 63
15. ^ Raven & Roberts (1976), p. 75
16. ^ Preston (2002), p. 96
17. ^ Burt (2012), pp. 306, 319–326
18. ^ Roberts (2003), p. 143
19. ^ ^{a b} Friedman (1978), p. 92
20. ^ Gardiner & Gray (1985), p. 231
21. ^ Gardiner & Gray (1985), p. 41
22. ^ Gardiner & Gray (1985), p. 260
23. ^ ADM1/9387: Uppercase Ships: Protection (1935), Bachelor on-line via the HMS Hood Association Website
24. ^ Chesneau (1980), p. 225
25. ^ Friedman (1978), p. 67
26. ^ Friedman (1978), pp. 47–48
27. ^ Chesneau (1980), pp. 171, 284
28. ^ Chesneau (1980), passim
29. ^ Friedman (1978), p. 307
30. ^ Chesneau (1980), p. 99
31. ^ Chesneau (1980), p. 100
32. ^ Chesneau (1980), p. 89
33. ^ Gardiner & Gray (1985) for Queen Elizabeth and Nagato; Chesneau (1980) for other classes, including reconstructions
34. ^ Preston (2002)
35. ^ Brown (2003b)
36. ^ Chesneau (1980), p. 173
37. ^ Robert Lundgren (2010). Tony DiGiulian (ed.). "Kirishima Impairment Analysis" (PDF).
38. ^ Chesneau (1980), p. 172
39. ^ Asmussen, John. "Bismarck: Gallery". www.bismarck-class.dk. Retrieved April 23, 2011.

Bibliography [edit]

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_battleship

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